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We analyze voting on subsidies for professional sports facilities in Harris County (Houston),
Texas and Brown County (Green Bay), Wisconsin to learn more about voter preferences for
these subsidies. The results di®er somewhat between the two jurisdictions, as do the nature of
the supports being proposed and the communities. One consistent result is that voting precincts
that have a relatively high degree of poverty tend to oppose subsidies for professional sports.
Another consistent result is that voters in close proximity to existing facilities are more likely
to favor subsidies than are voters living farther from the facilities. In Harris County, the results
consistently indicate that those over 65 years of age, whites, and those with Bachelors degrees
statistically signi¯cantly oppose subsidies while those with higher incomes and blacks favor the
subsidies. Di®erent values of consumption bene¯ts, stemming from di®erences in preferences,
may explain these voting patterns.
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Introduction and Motivation
What factors induce voters to support or oppose public subsidies for the construction or renovation
of professional sports facilities? Referenda on subsidies for sports facilities occur frequently. Fort
(1997) identi¯ed 29 stadium or arena referendums between 1974 and 1996.1 Many more stadium
subsidy referendums have been on the ballot since then. In the fall of 2000 alone, Green Bay, Wis-
consin, Phoenix, Arizona, and Houston, Texas each had referenda on public support of professional
sports. Seattle, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, the state of Wisconsin (rejected creation of a lottery to pay
for a new stadium for the Brewers in spring 1995, legislature raised taxes to fund it), Houston (in
1999 and 2000), Columbus, Ohio, San Antonio, St. Paul, Minnesota, Greensboro, North Carolina,
Scottsdale, Arizona, and Omaha, Nebraska have held referenda on stadium or arena subsidies since
1996. Often times the battles over these referenda have been protracted a®airs, sometimes involving
whether or not a referendum should be held at all, and, if so, when it should occur.
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1Of these 29 referenda, 12 passed and 17 failed to pass, making it seem that stadium proponents are generally
unsuccessful at getting voters to support them. This appearance may be misleading.
1The issues in these referenda are often complex. The size of the subsidies, and the large revenue
streams generated by new or renovated sports facilities, provide teams with strong incentives to
sway public opinion toward their side in these votes. Local politicians also stand to bene¯t, in
terms of political capital and visible accomplishments in the community, from the granting of these
subsidies. Public campaigning often complicates voters decisions on these matters. Proponents
of public subsidies for sports facilities often commission consultants to produce \economic impact
studies" that purport to measure the (inevitably large and unambiguously positive) economic ben-
e¯ts generated by new sports facilities. Academic studies of the economic impact of professional
sports facilities, on the other hand, have generally found either no evidence of positive economic
bene¯ts, or evidence of a negative economic impact. Depending on how informed the voting public
is, the cost-bene¯t calculation on such a proposal may be far from clear.
In this paper we aim to increase our understanding of the factors that a®ect voting on subsidies
for sports facility construction and renovation by empirically analyzing several recent referenda on
subsidies for the construction and renovation of professional sports facilities held in Green Bay,
Wisconsin and Houston, Texas. The circumstances surrounding the votes in each jurisdiction, the
details of the subsidies, the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the jurisdictions,
and the outcomes all di®ered, providing us with considerable variation in the referenda. In each
case we exploit the results from votes on similar questions in these jurisdictions to increase the
e±ciency of our empirical analysis, an important consideration for the relatively small sample sizes
involved.
We selected these two cities because they held multiple referenda on sport-related subsidies in
a short period of time, creating a richer and more interesting setting than in other cities that held
single, isolated referenda. Additionally, the data on voting in these referenda were available on
the web, reducing the time and e®ort required for data collection. Finally, matching voting data
to other data sources containing demographic and economic control variables is di±cult and time
consuming. This limits the number of referenda that can be analyzed in a reasonable amount of
time.
Public subsidies for professional sports must be viewed somewhat di®erently than a cost-bene¯t
analysis of a public investment project, like funding for education, highway construction, or trash
collection, because of the consumption bene¯ts that voters derive from the existence of a local
professional sports team. These consumption bene¯ts are likely to be an important component of
the total economic bene¯ts of a proposed project. But because they are idiosyncratic to the voters
and because they do not pass through the market, placing a simple, convenient summary value on
these bene¯ts is extremely di±cult.
Given the lack of evidence for any positive economic impact on local economies from professional
sports, these consumption bene¯ts are likely to be what motivates people to vote in favor of public
subsidies for professional sports. The relatively spare literature on the public support for stadium
and arena subsidies includes chapters in Noll and Zimbalist's (1997) volume Sports, Jobs and Taxes
by Agostini, Quigley, and Smolenskey (1997), Blair and Swindell (1997), Fort (1997), and Baade
and Sanderson (1997), a law review article by Fort (1999), and a case study on Cincinnati by Brown
and Paul (1999). Only the Agostini, Quigley, and Smolensky (1997) chapter in Sports, Jobs and
Taxes estimates an empirical model of voting behavior on stadium referendums.
Fort (1997) surveyed referenda on sports subsidies up until about 1996. He argues that one can
infer from the outcomes whether median voter or agenda setter models better describe the process.
In the median voter model, the voter whose most preferred outcome exactly splits the ranking of
most favored alternatives will carry the day. Note however that this preference may bear little or
no relation to the Pareto e±cient outcome. In agenda setter models, the agenda setter chooses
the alternatives to be voted on in such a way as to get an outcome closer to his or her own most
2preferred alternative. In the context of referenda on stadium subsidies, the alternatives might be
for the community to subsidize the construction of the palace the local team so richly deserves or
requires to remain competitive, or to lose the local team to some other city. If the public believes
the threat of departure is credible, it is likely to vote for a larger subsidy than it would prefer.
Fort argues that close votes are support for the agenda setter model, and he shows that 64% of the
referendums carried a favorable vote share between 40% and 60%. He is not, therefore, impressed
with the argument that democracy has given the people the right to decide, and they have chosen
to support stadiums.
Manipulation of the process of the sort that Fort describes undoubtedly occurs. Stadium subsidy
proponents also generally expend vast sums of money campaigning for their proposals. For example,
the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported in its November 1, 2000 edition that the campaign ¯nance
arm of the Green Bay Packers spent $858,000 to win voter approval for the redevelopment of
Lambeau Field. Added to $568,000 in lobbying expenses at the state level spent to get the sales
tax referendum before the Brown County voters, the Packers spent more than $1.42 million on the
referendum. Of this amount, $435,000 was spent on advertising on TV and radio, and on market
research to help the Packers focus their campaign message. Opponents of the plan spent $34,996.
Agostini, et al. (1997) estimated vote share equations for two referenda on proposals to subsidize
a new baseball stadium for the San Francisco Giants in 1989 and 1996. The results from these two
vote share equations are similar; the fraction of voters supporting each proposal rose with income,
with the share of people in executive and managerial jobs, and with the share of voters with college
degrees. Precincts with large Hispanic populations voted against the proposals, while precincts with
larger Asian populations voted for the stadium subsidies, at least in some models. Interestingly,
precincts with larger male population shares tended to vote against the stadium proposals.
Pooling the data for the two referendums and including a dummy variable for the 1996 vote,
which passed, the authors focused on parameter stability and outcome di®erences in the two votes.
They con¯rmed that the coe±cients were stable over the referenda; the e®ect of income, education,
race, etc. on the vote for a stadium subsidy was the same in both 1989 and 1996. They also examined
why the outcome of the successful 1996 referendum and the unsuccessful 1989 referendum di®ered.
The di®erence appears to be that the cost to taxpayers was reduced from 1989 to 1996. In fact,
a dummy variable for the 1996 election in a pooled regression indicates that the pro-stadium vote
increased by about 15% over what it would have been in 1989. The authors conclude that this
additional 15% of the vote came from lowering the taxpayers' cost of the stadium subsidy.
We adopt the basic approach used by Agostini, Quigley, and Smolensky (1997). We match
census tract data with voting precinct data for Harris County (Houston), Texas and Brown County
(Green Bay), Wisconsin, where referenda related to professional sports subsidies were on the ballot
in the Fall of 2000. Because the underlying issues di®ered in the two jurisdictions, the voting results
cannot be pooled. Harris County had a single vote that occurred simultaneously with presidential
balloting. However, Harris County voted on a similar measure in 1999 and also cast ballots on a
non-binding measure to gauge interest in using local tax revenues to support a bid for the 2012
Summer Olympics. Brown County held three votes, two on the same day in September 2000 and
a third simultaneously with the presidential election in November 2000.
Our empirical analysis di®ers from Agostini, Quigley, and Smolensky (1997) in two ways. Be-
cause of di®erences in the circumstances surrounding these two referenda, we estimate a SUR logit
model of voting on sports referenda. We describe the circumstances in detail below. Also, the
Green Bay proposal included renovation of an existing stadium and the Houston proposal identi-
¯ed the speci¯c site of the proposed new stadium had. This allows us to construct measures of the
3distance from the facility to each precinct for use as explanatory variables in our analysis.2 Second,
we have data from several di®erent sports related votes that occurred in a short period of time in
each jurisdiction. Data from these referenda enable us to estimate a system of vote equations that
improves the e±ciency of our estimates.
Two Sports Subsidy Referenda
Brown County (Green Bay), Wisconsin and Harris County (Houston), Texas each held referenda
relating to public ¯nancing of stadium or arena projects in November 2000. How they arrived at
these referenda, and the issues that were placed on the ballots, di®er substantially. These di®erences
play an important role in shaping our empirical analysis, so a thorough understanding of the details
of the referenda in each jurisdiction is important. In this section we describe the circumstances
leading up to the votes in each jurisdiction.
Brown County
Brown County, Wisconsin contains Green Bay, home of the National Football League (NFL) Pack-
ers, a storied franchise rooted in the earliest days of the NFL. The team was organized in 1919 and
J. E. Clair of the Acme Packing Company was granted an NFL franchise in 1921.3 E. L. \Curly"
Lambeau purchased the franchise in 1922 for $250 of which $50 was his own. In 1934, after losing
a lawsuit concerning a fall by a spectator inside the stadium, the local business community raised
$15,000 to rescue the club from bankruptcy. Despite winning numerous championships, the club
needed $50,000 in loans in 1949 to stave o® bankruptcy. In 1950 the club raised $118,000 through
a stock o®ering, putting them in sound ¯nancial footing.
In 1957, City Stadium, opened as the Packers home; the stadium was renamed Lambeau Field
in 1965. Seventy-two private boxes were added in 1985, and in 1986 the Packers reported an annual
pro¯t of over $2 million for the ¯rst time. Pro¯t passed $3 million in 1987 and in 1989 the Packers
announced plans to add more private boxes and to construct 1,920 club seats at a cost of over $8
million. Pro¯ts approached $5 million in 1993, and in 1994 plans were announced for construction
of additional private boxes. These boxes were completed in 1995 and pro¯ts edged over the $5
million mark in 1996 and 1997. Improvements to Lambeau Field continued with new scoreboards
added in 1996 and a new playing surface installed in 1997. The Packers also issued 400,000 shares of
stock, at a price of $200 per share, in 1997, the ¯rst public o®ering of stock since 1950. In 1998 the
Packers' pro¯ts exceed $6 million and they announced that the stock sale increased shareholders
by 106,000, raising $24 million.
In 2000, the Packers reported an operating loss of $419,000 but also announced plans for a
$295 million redevelopment project for Lambeau Field. Financing for the project was to come
from a 0:5% add-on to the state sales tax to apply only in Brown County. The tax was passed by
referendum in September by a vote of 48,788 in favor to 42,580 opposed. Also on the ballot at the
same time was a proposal that any excess revenues raised by the sales tax would be used to lower
local property taxes. This proposal failed with the opposition taking 56% of the vote. After the
community agreed to tax itself to pay for renovations to Lambeau Field, a third proposal came up
which would use funds generated by sale of the naming rights to the ¯eld to reduce the burden on
the local tax payers of paying for the stadium renovation. This proposal passed on general election
day in November after debate that was described by the Milwaukee Journal as subdued.
2Fort (1997) suggests that these factors might be important.
3Information in this section is taken http://www.packers.com/history/chronology/index.html, the Packers' o±cial
web site.
4Harris County
Harris County, Texas includes the city of Houston, which is the home to the Houston Astros of
Major League Baseball, the Houston Rockets of the National Basketball Association, and, through
1996 the Houston Oilers of the NFL. The Oilers left Houston after the 1996 season for Nashville,
Tennessee to become the Tennessee Titans, leaving Houston without a professional football team.4
Typically, one point of contention between the Oilers and Houston was dissatisfaction with their
home, the Astrodome. The Oilers were not alone in feeling dissatis¯ed with the Astrodome which
also was home to the Astros.
The Oilers move to Tennessee prompted local politicians to push for construction of a new
stadium to attract a new football franchise to Houston and, at the same time, to avert the loss
of the Astros. In June of 1996, city o±cials made plans to hold a referendum on spending more
than $625 million on new facilities for the baseball and football franchises. The possibility of
a referendum on building a new arena for the Rockets in Houston was also raised at this time.
On November 5, 1996 voters passed a referendum to support facilities for baseball and football.
Houston Mayor Bob Lanier proclaimed the deal inherent in the referendum \a good play" as it
would not raise either property or general sales taxes and would require both teams to sign a thirty
year lease. The ¯nal outcome of voting was a victory for stadium proponents; 51% of the vote
supported stadium construction.
A key for this research was the omission of funding for an arena for the Houston Rockets in 1996.
The Texas state legislature debated and passed a bill in 1997 that would allow local jurisdictions to
impose taxes to construct or repair sports facilities. However, the bill required a local referendum
before new taxes could be imposed on car rentals, parking, and tickets to sports events. Because
Houston and Harris County had held a referendum on the baseball and football stadium issue, but
had not done so for construction of a new basketball facility, the legislation required Houston to
hold one.
In April of 1998, the Houston Chronicle reported that, based on a poll of Harris County residents,
73% supported building a new facility for the Houston Rockets so long as no new taxes were required.
Armed with this information, the Rockets pushed for an August referendum. Also, 87% of those
polled believed it was important or very important that the Rockets remain in Houston, and 85%
believed it was important or very important that the Rockets remain competitive and make the
playo®s every year.
A deal to include a ticket tax in the ¯nancing mix, along with increases in hotel and rental
car taxes, resulted in an agreement between Houston Mayor Lee Brown and Rockets owner Les
Alexander to place a referendum for a new arena before the voters. The ticket tax was a sticking
point because football and rodeo interests were afraid that, without revenues from the ticket tax,
the city would be unable to a®ord both a new arena and a new football stadium. The Mayor
expressed con¯dence that the referendum would pass.
Under the proposed arena deal, the Rockets received a $160 million facility for which they would
bear half the cost. The facility was to be ready for the 2003 seasons of the Houston Comets of the
WNBA and the Houston Rockets of the NBA. In addition, the team would control the revenues
from all arena events. This meant that all ticket revenues, merchandising and naming rights would
belong to the team. Additionally, the team would have exclusive control over advertising rights
during both Rockets games and all other events.
The referendum was defeated on November 2, 1999 by a vote of 55% to 45%. Team owner Les
Alexander told the Houston Chronicle (November 4, 1999), \We never thought we would lose."
Interestingly, across the state in San Antonio at the same time, voters in Bexar County passed a
4Houston was awarded an expansion NFL franchise, the Texans, who began play in 2002 in a new stadium.
5referendum 60% to 40% in favor of raising hotel and rental car taxes to help fund a $175 million
arena for the San Antonio Spurs who were then playing in the 6-year old AlamoDome.
One year later, voters in Houston and Harris County faced another referendum on using hotel
and rental car taxes to fund construction of an arena for the Houston Rockets. This proposal
did not include provision for a tax on ticket sales. In addition, the opposition in 2000 sought to
block the arena entirely, whereas in 1999, according to the Houston Chronicle (October 4, 2000,
section A, page 19), opponents of the plan simply wanted a better funding deal for the taxpayers.
The absence of the ticket tax meant that many opponents from 1999, including some of the most
prominent, had become supporters in 2000. Moreover, the Houston Chronicle also reported that
the opponents in 1999 spent nearly $700,000 on their campaign, but the 2000 opponents had far
less resources to devote to the ¯ght. Proponents reportedly spent over $2.5 million, much of it
coming from Rockets owner Les Alexander. The referendum passed with over 60% of the vote.
At the same time that Houston voters were considering the arena issue in 2000, they also voted
on a referendum designed to measure interest in a bid to host the 2012 Olympics. The referendum,
if passed, would allow hotel taxes to be diverted into a trust fund which would, if Houston landed
the 2012 Olympics, provide up to $100 million to cover losses if the event lost money. If hosting the
Olympics turned a pro¯t, then the trust funds would be released to the city and state which would
normally have received them. Little opposition to the measure arose, and both major political
parties endorsed it. Still, the measure received only about 60% of the vote.
Empirical Model
We focus on identifying the factors that induce voters to support or oppose plans for public funding
of the construction or renovation of sports facilities. Ideally, information on individual voters,
including income, tax price, and socio-demographic characteristics, would be matched with that
person's vote allowing estimation of a logit or probit model using maximum likelihood methods.
The estimated parameters would, in this case, be interpretable as coming from the indirect utility
function of the voter.
Unfortunately, the data available to us come in the form of precinct or census tract level aggre-
gates. We cannot match individual voters with their votes nor with their personal characteristics.
We can match voting outcomes in precincts with descriptive characteristics of the residents of the
precincts. This allows us to make inferences about, for example, how college graduates vote, by not-
ing that as the proportion of the precinct's population that has a college degree rises, the precinct's
share of the vote in favor of the stadium referendum rises (or falls).
We estimate a logit model because the available data describe the socio-demographic charac-
teristics of the voting precinct and the vote totals for and against the referendum. The dependent
variable, lori, is the log of the ratio of the share of yes votes to the share of no votes in precinct i.
The determinants of this variable are the economic and demographic characteristics of the voters
in precinct i at the time of the ballot and measures of the proximity of precinct i to the existing or
proposed facility ( Xi).
lori = ¯Xi + ¹i (1)
where ¯ is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ¹i is a mean 0 random shock which is
uncorrelated across precincts. ¹i is heteroscedastic as a consequence of the logit speci¯cation. We
address this problem by using weighted least squares because the nature of the heteroscedasticity
is precisely known for logit models.
We also exploit the multiple votes regarding the stadium ¯nancing in Brown County, along with
the two arena votes in consecutive years and the Olympic vote in Harris County, to further improve
6the e±ciency of our estimates. In particular, because of the three votes in each location, we can
estimate a system of logit models using seemingly unrelated regression techniques for each vote
lori1 = ¯1Xi1 + ¹i1 (2)
lori2 = ¯2Xi2 + ¹i2 (3)
lori3 = ¯3Xi3 + ¹i3: (4)
The equation errors, ¹ij j=1, 2, 3, have mean zero and constant, but possibly unequal, variance
and are correlated. Formally, we assume that E[¹ij¹ik] 6= 0;j 6= k.
The correlation in the error terms arises because there are unobserved in°uences on the voting
behavior of residents in precinct i that a®ect the votes on each of the separate ballot items. Using
the correlation among the error terms enables us to get ¯ner estimates of their variance, improving
the e±ciency of the coe±cient estimates.
Data
The data for this analysis comes from two sources. Voting results from all precincts were gathered
from county government web sites for both Harris County and Brown County. The addresses of
voting stations were used to determine the census tract containing each station. Once matched,
data from the 1990 Decennial Census, the most recent census available at the time of the data
collection, were merged with the precinct-level voting results.
Voting precincts tend to be smaller than census tracts, so in some cases two or more precincts
were mapped into the same census tract. In these cases, the explanatory variables from the census
data are identical for each voting precinct, but the vote share on each referendum di®ers. For
example, in those tracts containing multiple precincts, the spread in the share of the vote for the
sales tax increase for Brown County ranges from only a few tenths of a percentage point to tens of
percentage points, but the explanatory variables for these precincts are the same.
Note also that the percent voting in favor of the tax increase or stadium construction ranges
from 47.5% in the 1999 vote in Harris County to 66.8%, also in Harris County. The vote share in
Brown County was 50.9% in favor of the sales tax increase. The Brown County vote and the 1999
vote in Harris County both are in the range that Fort (1997) argues provides evidence in favor of
an agenda setter model. The 66.8% vote in the 2000 referendum in Harris County is not consistent
with the Fort's setter model.5
The explanatory variables include socio-demographic and economic characteristics of each cen-
sus tract. Table 1 contains variable de¯nitions and descriptive statistics for all the variables in the
analysis of Brown County-Green Bay and Harris County-Houston.6 We also include variables that
re°ect the distance from the existing or proposed facility to the geographic center of each census
tract as regressors. These variables capture the idea that people living close to an existing sports
facility, or in the area where the new facility will be constructed, may have stronger preferences or
more information about the costs and bene¯ts associated with living near a stadium or arena.
Census tracts were separated into four categories in terms of distance from an existing or
proposed facility:
5The wide disparity in spending on advertising and promotions in favor of the pro-stadium or arena groups is also
consistent with the agenda setter model.
6The Census data were taken from the CensusCD, version 4, produced by GeoLytics, Incorporated using the 1990
United States Census.
7Table 1: Variable De¯nitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable De¯nition Precincts Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Brown County-Green Bay, Wisconsin
YTAX % voting yes on sales tax 91 50.9 9.4 16.6 68.5
YSELL % voting yes on naming rights 98 52.9 3.9 44.9 66.5
YCUT % voting yes on tax cut 91 44.4 5.3 26.2 55.9
Gore % voting for Gore 98 47.0 7.5 29.6 65.0
Rent % renters in tract 98 32.5 17.7 6.9 96.5
Urban % urban 98 81.332 38.146 0.000 100.00
College % With bachelor's degree 98 16.377 8.495 1.700 38.400
Poverty % Living in poverty in tract 98 9.602 8.368 1.600 39.600
Exec % Executive jobs in tract 98 10.4 3.9 3.8 21.7
White % White 98 96.3 4.5 80.2 100.0
N1 Closest tracts to facility 98 0.143 0.352 0.000 1.000
N2 Second closest tracts to facility 98 0.184 0.389 0.000 1.000
N3 Third closest tracts to facility 98 0.031 0.173 0.000 1.000
River Across river from facility 98 0.071 0.259 0.000 1.000
P65 % 65 years old or more in tract 98 10.5 5.3 2.2 41.6
Inc Median Family Income 98 36288 8109 13182 52118
Harris County-Houston, Texas
Y99 % in favor of subsidy in 1999 vote 1790 47.5 17.6 0.000 100.0
Y00 % in favor of subsidy in 2000 vote 1830 66.8 12.5 0.000 100.0
YOLY % in favor of subsidy to Olympics 1572 75.7 8.4 25.0 97.2
Gore % voting for Gore 1834 50.2 25.8 0.000 1.000
Rent % renters in tract 2108 37.1 17.5 0.000 92.9
Urban % urban 2134 94.86 19.804 0.000 100.0
College % with bachelor's degree in tract 2134 22.39 19.222 0.000 78.3
Poverty % living in poverty 2134 17.29 13.943 0.000 100.0
Exec % executive jobs 2108 12.4 7.6 0.000 37.2
White % white 2112 62.8 29.2 0.000 100.0
Black % black 2112 21.5 29.1 0.000 99.6
Spanish % speak Spanish 2112 18.5 16.9 0.000 100.0
Near1 Closest tracts to facility 2136 0.018 0.132 0.000 1.000
Near2 Second closest tracts to facility 2136 0.018 0.132 0.000 1.000
Near3 Third closest tracts to facility 2136 0.027 0.163 0.000 1.000
P65 % 65 years old or more in tract 2112 7.9 4.9 0.000 29.6
Inc Median Family Income 2134 36977 21083 0 150001
New1 Closest tracts to proposed facility 2136 0.036 0.185 0.000 1.000
New2 Second closest tracts to proposed facility 2136 0.031 0.173 0.000 1.000
New3 Third closest to tracts proposed facility 2136 0.036 0.185 0.000 1.000
1. \Very Close" Tracts: contain Lambeau Field or the Compaq Center or are contiguous to the
tract containing the existing facilities (Near1) or contain or are contiguous to the proposed
new arena in Houston (New1)
2. \Close" Tracts: Contiguous to \Very Close" tracts (Near2, New2)
3. \Somewhat Close" Tracts: Contiguous to \Close" tracts (Near3, New3)
4. All Other Tracts
We constructed dummy variables, shown in parentheses, to identify these voting precincts and
tracts. This taxonomy makes the classi¯cation of distance from a facility sound far more de¯nite
and straightforward than it really was. Because tracts vary in size and shape, some tracts that
would be in the \somewhat close" category under strict adherence to the rules described above
were, nonetheless, placed in the close or even the very close groups. Consequently, placement of
many tracts was subject to rough judgements of distances.
8Harris County di®ers from Brown County in one important respect regarding the distance
variables. Harris County has an existing facility and the proposals refer to construction of a new
facility in a di®erent location, while in Brown County the proposal is about refurbishment or
renovation of the existing facility. Consequently, in the Harris County analysis are two sets of
variables, one indicating distance from the Compaq Center (Near1, Near2, Near3) and another
indicating distance from the proposed new facility (New1, New2, New3).
These two locations are near enough to each other that some census tracts are \Somewhat close"
to the proposed location and \Somewhat close," \Close," and even \Very Close" to the existing
facility. To identify these tracts, we created a third set of proximity dummy variables (Over13,
Over23, Over33) that identify tracts \Very Close" to one facility and \Somewhat close to the other
(Over13), tracts \Close" to one facility and \Somewhat Close" to the other facility (Over23), and
tracts \Somewhat Close" to both facilities (Over33).
Brown County also has a unique feature that we include in our empirical analysis. Some voting
precincts are fairly close to Lambeau Field but on the opposite side of the Fox River. These tracts
are spatially close to the stadium but the driving distance from these tracts to the stadium is
relatively long due to the absence of bridges over the river near the stadium. We indicate these
areas with a variable that takes on the value 1 for those districts across the river from Lambeau
¯eld, and takes on the value 0 for all other precincts.
Figure 1 shows the census tracts that fall into each category for the existing facility in Harris
County, the Compaq Center. On this ¯gure, the lines show the census tract boarders. The dark-
est shaded tracts are those identi¯ed by the variable Near1, the lightest shaded tracts are those
identi¯ed by variable Near2, and the middle shade are tracts identi¯ed by variable Near3.
Figure 2 shows the census tracts that fall into each category for the proposed facility in Harris
County, the the Houston Arena. Again, the lines show the census tract boarders in Harris County.
The darkest shaded tracts are those identi¯ed by the variable New1, the lightest shaded tracts are
those identi¯ed by variable New2, and the middle shade are tracts identi¯ed by variable New3.
Figure 3 shows the census tracts near Lambeau Field in Brown County. On this ¯gure, the
lightest shaded tracts are those identi¯ed by the variable Near1, the next lightest shaded tracts are
those identi¯ed by variable Near2, and the darkest shaded tracts are tracts identi¯ed by variable
Near3 and tracts across the river from the stadium.
Empirical Results
Separate SUR logit models were estimated for each county. Table 2 contains the results from
estimating a seemingly unrelated logit regression voting model for the three votes held in Brown
County (Green Bay). The three voting equations explain a large fraction of the observed variation
in vote shares, indicated by the relatively large values of R2 for each equation. On the question of
whether or not the sales tax should be raised to ¯nance renovation of Lambeau Field, the evidence
suggests that three characteristics of the population are statistically signi¯cant determinants of
voting behavior: the percent of the population in a voting precinct living in poverty, the voting
precincts located in urban areas of Brown County, and the percent of the population in a voting
precinct employed as executives, here interpreted as \white collar" occupations. Additionally, the
percent of the population in a voting precinct holding a college degree was nearly signi¯cant, with
a p-value of 0.104.
Poor precincts voted against the sales tax increase, a regressive tax in most instances, to ¯nance
the renovation of Lambeau Field. Urban and white collar precincts voted for the sales tax increase.
The equation explaining voting on use of any surplus funds generated by the sales tax increase
to reduce local property taxes has only one statistically signi¯cant variable. Voters in relatively
9Figure 1: Compaq Center Proximity
10Figure 2: Houston Arena Proximity
11Figure 3: Lambeau Field Proximity
12Table 2: Regression Results: Brown County
Variable Sales Tax Vote Property Tax Cut Vote Naming Rights Vote
Coe±cient p-value Coe±cient p-value Coe±cient p-value
Constant 0.363 0.636 -0.783 0.230 0.799 0.095
P65 -0.567 0.285 0.350 0.433 -0.512 -0.122
Male 0.000 0.699 0.000 0.446 0.000 0.164
White -0.917 0.174 0.167 0.771 -0.457 0.277
Poverty -0.011 0.035 0.002 0.620 -0.002 0.522
Urban 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.465
College 0.007 0.104 0.001 0.829 0.003 0.288
Inc 0.000 0.794 0.000 0.914 0.000 0.453
Rent 0.221 0.221 0.120 0.430 -0.154 0.189
Exec 1.875 0.029 1.295 0.073 -0.158 0.781
Near1 0.198 0.001 0.073 0.141 -0.192 0.000
Near2 0.103 0.048 0.023 0.594 -0.113 0.001
Near3 0.004 0.978 -0.011 0.925 -0.125 0.133
River 0.102 0.189 0.098 0.130 -0.053 0.278
R2/N 0.76 91 0.76 91 0.70 91
more urban precincts were more likely to vote favorably on the property tax relief. The percent of
the population in the district that is employed as an executive is also signi¯cant at the 10% level
in this equation. In the third referendum, voters were asked to consider the sale of the naming
rights to the renovated ¯eld. No socio-demographic variables were statistically signi¯cant in this
equation.
The estimated parameters on the proximity variables in the system of voting equations for Brown
County contain several interesting patterns. In both the sales tax and naming rights equations,
precincts identi¯ed by Near1 and Near2 voted di®erently than other precincts. Proximity to the
facility in°uenced voters casting ballots on stadium or arena subsidies as Fort (1997) suggested.
Those closest to Lambeau Field voted strongly in favor of raising the sales tax rate to subsidize
renovation of the stadium and about equally strongly in opposition to selling the naming rights to
the stadium. This result suggests that voters living near the facility valued Lambeau Field more
than voters living farther from the facility. The result also suggests that the non-pecuniary bene¯ts
generated by Lambeau Field may be distributed unequally across the Green Bay metropolitan area.
The result for the naming rights issue suggests that voters living near the facility valued the current
name of the facility, relative to a name re°ecting corporate sponsorship of the team. This results
hints at another important non-pecuniary bene¯t from a professional sports team - residents of
cities appear to value the name of the facility where the local team plays.
Table 3 shows the results of tests of the appropriateness of the SUR framework. The results
of these tests show that the errors from the three equations are not independent. Recall that
the SUR estimation approach assumes that the equation errors from the system of three voting
equations estimated are correlated, and exploits this correlation to improve the e±ciency of the
point estimates. The evidence on Table 3 suggests that the equation terms for these three equations
are correlated. The unobservable factors that a®ect the outcomes of each of the three votes are
statistically related.
Table 4 reports the estimates of a SUR logit voting model for the 1999 and 2000 votes on
funding a new basketball facility. In general, the parameters on the demographic and economic
control variables in the system of Harris County voting equations are signi¯cant, perhaps because
of the larger number of voting precincts, and correspondingly larger sample size, in this jurisdiction.
Note that because of the relatively large latino population in Houston, we use variables indicating
13Table 3: Correlation matrix of residuals: Brown County
Equation Sales Tax Property Tax Cut Naming Rights
Sales Tax 1.0000
Property Tax Cut 0.5317 1.0000
Sell naming rights -0.0917 -0.1305 1.0000
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(3) = 28.037, Pr = 0.0000
both the number of blacks and whites living in each precinct in these regressions. We also include
a variable for the number of Spanish speaking residents in each precinct in the Houston voting
model.
The ¯rst referendum analyzed, the 1999 vote on raising taxes on hotel rooms, rental cars,
and sports event tickets to fund the construction of a new basketball arena, was unsuccessful.
The results for this referendum, shown in columns two and three, show that precincts with large
populations of the elderly, whites, persons living in poverty, and persons with college degrees, were
more likely to oppose the subsidy, while voting precincts with higher family incomes and containing
more black voters were more likely to favor the subsidy than are other voters. These results di®er
from the voting results from Brown County, where few demographic and economic variables were
statistically signi¯cant.
The second referendum analyzed, the 2000 vote on raising taxes on hotel rooms and rental
cars, was successful. The results for the second referendum, shown in columns three and four, are
very similar to those from the earlier vote. Again, precincts with large populations of the elderly,
whites, persons living in poverty, and persons with college degrees, were more likely to oppose the
subsidy, while voting precincts with higher family incomes and containing more black voters were
more likely to favor the subsidy than are other voters. In the second referendum, precincts with a
larger proportion of white collar employees and precincts with large proportions of the population
speaking Spanish were also more likely to vote for the tax ¯nanced sports subsidy.
Like Green Bay, the proximity variables are strongly signi¯cant in Houston. Interestingly, both
close proximity to the existing facility and close proximity to the proposed new facility signi¯cantly
increase the likelihood of a vote in favor of the subsidy for the new arena. Also, the coe±cient on
Near1 is twice that on Near3, suggesting that those most closely located around the existing facility
vote most heavily in favor of subsidizing construction of a new facility. At the same time, those
closest to the site of the proposed new facility are less favorably inclined than those that are \close"
but not too close to the proposed site. In other words, experience with nearness convinces one that
proximity is a net cost, while promises of net bene¯ts may entice locals to support construction of
a new arena in their neighborhood.
Finally, those precincts identi¯ed by the proximity interaction variables - that is, that are in
a ring for both the existing and the proposed sites - are less likely to support the subsidy for the
new facility than are either precincts not near the facilities under any of the three classi¯cations
or those precincts in proximity to only one of the sites. In other words, those precincts close to
the existing facility prefer to have the new facility constructed unless they are close enough to the
new site, in which case they prefer no new facility be subsidized. The extent of this preference
grows dramatically as precincts get farther from the existing facility without growing closer to the
proposed new one. The implication is that people who have experienced proximity to the arena are
willing to give up that nearness for greater distance from the facility, but they appear unwilling to
subsidize a new facility without it being constructed farther from them than the existing arena.
14Table 4: Regression Results: Harris County
Variable 1999 Vote 2000 Vote
Coe±cient p-value Coe±cient p-value
Constant 0.027 0.871 0.846 0.000
P65 -0.391 0.045 -0.515 0.001
Male (a) 0.005 0.194 0.003 0.302
White -.903 0.000 -0.594 0.000
Poverty -0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.020
Urban (b) -0.146 0.780 -0.427 0.181
College -0.003 0.005 -0.005 0.000
Inc (a) 0.041 0.000 0.037 0.000
Rent 0.063 0.242 0.053 0.192
Exec 0.249 0.322 0.587 0.002
Spanish (a) 0.436 0.002 0.224 0.047
Black 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.000
Near1 0.212 0.000 0.157 0.000
Near2 0.139 0.031 0.114 0.019
Near3 0.097 0.009 0.072 0.017
New1 0.133 0.063 0.087 0.131
New2 0.235 0.000 0.043 0.263
New3 0.250 0.000 0.152 0.000
Over13 -0.258 0.008 -0.207 0.011
Over23 -0.295 0.010 -0.227 0.015
Over33 -0.307 0.004 -0.175 0.063
R2/N 0.78 1736 0.90 1736
(a): Coe±cients and standard errors multiplied by 10000.
(b): Coe±cients and standard errors multiplied by 1000.
Table 5 shows the correlation between the residuals from the two voting equations estimated
using data from Houston. Again, the residuals from these two equations are correlated and the null
hypothesis of statistical independence is strongly rejected. These results support the use of a SUR
logit model to simultaneously estimate both voting equations.
Table 5: Correlation matrix of residuals: Harris County
Equation 1999 Vote 2000 Vote
1999 Vote 1.0000
2000 Vote 0.8611 1.0000
Breusch-Pagan test of independence:
chi2(1) = 1287.4, Pr = 0.0000
Table 6 contains the results of simultaneously estimating the voting equations for the 1999
and 2000 referenda on tax ¯nanced sports subsidies along with an equation for the referendum to
support the bid for the 2012 Summer Olympics. As this last vote was only held in the city of
Houston, as opposed to the entirety of Harris County, these results are based only on data from
voting precincts in the city. The Olympic vote model contains no proximity variables because no
speci¯c Olympic venues were identi¯ed in that vote.
The results from this three equation system are virtually identical to those for the 1999 and
2000 referenda reported above. As before, support for the arena plans comes from precincts with
higher median income and greater proportions of black voters and is greater among those living
near to either the existing facility or the site of the proposed new arena. Opposition comes from
15the precincts with higher proportions of whites, the relatively more educated, more urbanized and
poorer populations. Renters were more likely to vote in favor of the subsidy in 2000, though not
in 1999. Support for the Olympic bid follows these same patterns.
Table 6: Regression Results: Houston - Olympics
Variable 1999 Vote 2000 Vote Olympic Bid
Coe±cient p-value Coe±cient p-value Coe±cient p-value
Constant 0.199 0.261 0.969 0.000 1.440 0.000
P65 -0.312 0.154 -0.285 0.091 -0.325 0.037
Male (a) -1.220 0.001 -0.009 0.015 -0.004 0.913
White -0.902 0.016 -0.664 0.000 -0.566 0.000
Poverty -0.005 0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.002
Urban -0.001 0.041 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.075
College -0.003 0.003 -0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.001
Inc (a) 0.035 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.017 0.009
Renters 0.090 0.131 0.107 0.016 0.127 0.001
Exec 0.238 0.408 0.791 0.000 0.276 0.152
Speak Spanish (a) 0.498 0.001 0.285 0.017 0.214 0.048
Black 0.011 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.007 0.000
Near1 0.084 0.102 0.096 0.005
Near2 0.093 0.111 0.050 0.168
Near3 0.098 0.001 0.058 0.005
New 1 0.089 0.101 0.039 0.305
New 2 0.239 0.000 0.056 0.020
New 3 0.164 0.000 0.071 0.004
Over 1 3 0.048 0.541 -0.002 0.972
Over 2 3 -0.113 0.202 -0.042 0.482
Over 3 3 -0.079 0.349 0.021 0.727
R2/N 0.78 1280 0.90 1280 0.96 1280
(a): Coe±cients and standard errors have been multiplied by 10000.
Interestingly, when only the Houston precincts are analyzed the precincts that fall near to both
the existing and the proposed facility - the proximity interaction variables - are not statistically
signi¯cant and the coe±cients on the variables indicating proximity to the existing and proposed
new arenas also much smaller in size and less precisely estimated.
Table 7 shows the correlation between the residuals from the three equation SUR system and
a test of statistical independence for these residuals. Once again, the residuals are correlated and
the null hypothesis of statistical independence is rejected, supporting the SUR logit approach for
analyzing the vosting on these three referenda.
Table 7: Correlation matrix of residuals: Houston
Equation 1999 Vote 2000 Vote Olympic Vote
1999 Vote 1.0000
2000 Vote 0.8734 1.0000
Olympic Vote 0.7377 0.8119 1.0000
Breusch-Pagan test of independence:
chi2(3) = 2516.7, Pr =0.0000
16A Closer Look at Proximity
Because proximity to the sports facilities plays an important role in the empirical results presented
above, we further analyze the e®ects of proximity on voting in favor of a subsidy by calculating the
e®ects of proximity on the odds ratio from the empirical models. Table 8 reports the change in the
odds of a vote in favor of a stadium subsidy, based on proximity to either the existing facility or the
site of the proposed facility, for the statistically signi¯cant parameters on the location variables in
the three SUR logit systems estimated above. On this table, changes in odds ratios greater than one
can be interpreted as increasing the likelihood of voting yes in the referendum and changes in odds
ratios less than one can be interpreted as decreasing the likelihood of voting yes in the referendum.
The ¯rst row of the table shows that voters the the precinct containing Lambeau Field, and the
precincts contiguous to this precinct were 21.9% more likely to vote for the sales tax increase than
voters in other precincts and that voters in these precincts were 17.5% less likely to vote for selling
the naming rights to Lambeau Field. The voters in the next tier of voting precincts were 10.8%
morelikely to vote for the sales tax and 10.7% less likely to vote for selling the naming rights.
For the Harris County votes, the numbers in parentheses are the changes in the odds ratios for
the three equation SUR logit system that included the vote on the 2012 Olympic bid; the other
numbers are for the two equation SUR logit system. Proximity to the Compaq Center in Houston
raised the odds of a favorable vote on the arena referendums by between 7% and 24%. The range
falls to 6% to 10% when only the Houston precincts are analyzed. Being very near to the site for
the new arena results in an increase in the odds of a favorable vote of between 14% and 28%, when
all of Harris County is included in the analysis, and by from 5% to 27% when only the Houston
precincts are examined. Precincts that fall within close proximity to both venues show reductions
in the odds ratio of as little as 19% and as much as 27%.
Table 8: Changes in Odds Ratios and Proximity
Brown County (Green Bay)




Variable 1999 Vote 2000 Vote
Near1 1.236 1.170 (1.101)
Near2 1.149 1.121
Near3 1.102 (1.103) 1.075 (1.060)
New1 1.142
New2 1.265 (1.270) (1.058)




Again, we interpret these strong proximity e®ects on voting as evidence that the non-pecuniary
bene¯ts associated with sports facilities are not equally distributed across all areas of cities. Either
those voters who live close to sports facilities voted for these referenda because they derive greater
non-pecuniary bene¯ts from these facilities, or they have more information about the nature and
size of the relative bene¯ts and costs. Previous research on the economic impact of sports facilities
have not contained evidence of an unequal spatial distribution of these bene¯ts.
Note that the sample sizes di®er signi¯cantly for the two jurisdictions. Houston contains roughly
17an order of magnitude more precincts than Green Bay. This has a clear e®ect on the e±ciency of
the parameter estimates; the standard errors are much smaller for Houston. Sample size di®erences
make comparing the results across the two jurisdictions somewhat di±cult. In the discussion below,
we apply a less stringent signi¯cance level to the results from Green Bay, due to the e®ect of the
smaller sample size on the e±ciency of the parameter estimates for those votes.
Discussion
What do these results tell us about the determinants of votes for or against referenda on sports
subsidies? Unlike votes on subsidies for trash collection, highways, or education, the consumption
value of sports may be an important factor in referenda on sports subsidies and these consumption
bene¯ts may vary signi¯cantly across di®erent groups of voters. For example, voters would not
take into account consumption bene¯ts associated with attending primary or secondary school
when deciding on how to vote on a local school funding referendum. If the expected economic costs
of a project are perceived as similar by most voters in a jurisdiction, then consumption bene¯ts
may be an important determinant of voting. It may be possible that consumption bene¯ts are large
enough to induce some voters to support a proposed sports subsidy that makes no economic sense
solely as a local investment decision.
Do our results contain evidence that voters who derive greater consumption bene¯ts were more
likely to vote for these sports subsidies? This requires identi¯cation of groups that might derive
di®erent consumption bene¯ts from professional sports. Unfortunately, economic theory provides
no guidance on this point, as these di®erences stem from di®ering preferences.
Males are one identi¯able group who might derive signi¯cant consumption bene¯ts from pro-
fessional sports, and would thus be more likely to support subsidies for professional sports. The
empirical results do not, however, bear this out. The fraction of males in a precinct is not positive
and statistically signi¯cant in any of the referenda studied. Black voters, on the other hand, tend
to support the referenda while white voters do not. This could re°ect that whites derive lower
consumption bene¯ts, and blacks higher consumption bene¯ts, from professional sports. But these
race variables could capture more than just preferences for professional sports.
Median family income was a signi¯cant and positive determinant of voting for sports subsidies
in Harris County but insigni¯cant in Brown County. A²uent districts were more likely than
other districts to vote for sports subsidies in Houston, but not more likely to vote for the sports
subsidies in Green Bay. One reason for this di®erence in voting patterns could be the sport being
subsidized. In Houston, the proposed subsidy was for professional basketball while in Green Bay
the proposed subsidy was for professional football. Clearly, fans of a particular sport are one group
who would derive large consumption bene¯ts from the sport in question. If professional basketball
fans tend to be more a²uent and professional football fans tend to be less a²uent, then di®erences
in consumption bene¯ts could explain this di®erence in voting. This di®erence does not appear to
extend throughout the income distribution, because the percent of a precinct's population living
in poverty is a negative and statistically signi¯cant determinant of voting in favor of sports facility
subsidies in both Brown and Harris Counties, suggesting that the poorest citizens oppose subsidies
for professional sports in general.
A similar pattern emerges in the patterns of voting in urban precincts in Houston and Green Bay.
Urban voters in Green Bay tended to vote for the proposed sports subsidies while those in Houston
tended to vote against the proposed sports subsidies.7 This di®erence could re°ect the two di®erent
7When all of Harris County is analyzed the percent urban is not statistically signi¯cant at any reasonable proba-
bility level.
18sports being subsidized, and thus also re°ect di®erences in consumption values. Alternatively, the
demographic composition of the city and suburbs may di®er in these two jurisdictions.
Perhaps the most interesting evidence of di®erences in consumption bene¯ts emerges from the
signs and statistical signi¯cance of the proximity variables. Voter's proximity to the facilities was
an important factor in the outcomes in both jurisdictions. In Houston, voters living close to the
existing basketball arena, and those living close to the proposed site of a new arena were more
likely to vote for sports subsidies. In Green Bay, voters living close to Lambeau Field were more
likely to vote for sports subsidies, although they were less likely to vote for allowing the sale of
the naming rights to the stadium. Proximity to the sports facility can capture many di®erent
phenomena. Sports facilities may increase property values in the immediate area.8 In this case,
voters living near the facilities would bene¯t directly from renovation or construction of a facility.
In a model of perfect mobility households would sort themselves into di®erent areas of a city based
on the characteristics of the areas and the preferences of the households. In this context, households
that derive positive consumption bene¯ts from professional sports might prefer areas closer to the
sports facility. Households with these strong preferences would also be more likely to vote for sports
subsidies.
Note that in Houston voters living near the proposed new facility tended to vote in favor of
sports subsidies. This supports the idea that these voters perceived a direct economic bene¯t from
the new facility. However, it is very unlikely that this re°ects consumption bene¯ts, as this refers
to a proposed location, not a long time existing location of a sports facility, because individuals
with strong preferences for access to sporting events would not yet have moved to these precincts.
Conclusions
We empirically investigate the determinants of votes cast in referenda on economic subsidies for
professional sport facility construction and renovation in Green Bay, Wisconsin and Houston, Texas.
The votes in these two jurisdictions were interesting because several sports related referenda took
place in a relatively short period of time in each area, allowing us to improve on the e±ciency of
the estimates by estimating systems of vote share equations for each area.
Our analysis of voting on these referenda reveals several interesting patterns. We ¯nd striking
di®erences in the voting patterns of several groups of voters. Males were more likely to vote in favor
of sports subsidies and white, elderly, and more educated voters were more likely to vote against
sports subsidies in Houston. Whites and the poor are more likely to vote against subsidies in
Green Bay. One explanation for these patterns could be di®erences in the value of the consumption
bene¯ts associated with professional sports across groups of voters, a phenomena identi¯ed by
Agostini et al (1997) in referenda on sports subsidies in San Francisco.
New insight into the importance and nature of consumption bene¯ts from professional sports
is relevant, because it helps to explain why cities continue to attempt to attract new sports teams
and prevent existing teams from leaving by increasing the size of the subsidies given to these teams.
The retrospective evidence about the economic impact of professional sports teams and facilities on
local economies suggests that at best they have no economic impact and, as much recent evidence
shows, at worst they have a negative economic impact. This evidence suggests that, when viewed
simply as a public investment project, sports subsidies do not pass a cost-bene¯t test. Signi¯cant
consumption bene¯ts are one possible explanation for the continued economic support cities give
to professional sports team owners and players.
8Coates and Humphreys (2002) ¯nd evidence of somewhat higher property values within a quarter mile radius of
a sports facility.
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